

inclination, it will appear as if inclination were on the side of morality. Grace will therefore be the expression of female virtue, of which the male may often be wanting.

### DIGNITY

Just as grace is the expression of a beautiful soul, *dignity* is the expression of a noble disposition of mind.

It is, indeed, the person's task to establish an intimate accord between his two natures, always to be a harmonizing whole, and act with his full-voiced entire humanity. But, this beauty of character, the ripest fruit of his humanity, is merely an idea, to be in accord with which, he must strive with persistent vigilance, but which, for all of his effort, he can never entirely achieve.

The reason why he can never achieve it lies in the inalterable constitution of his nature; it is the physical conditions of his very existence which prevent him.

In order, that is, to secure his existence in the world of sense, which depends on natural conditions, the person must (since, as a creature which can willfully change himself, he must provide for his subsistence himself) be enabled to deeds, whereby those physical conditions of his existence may be fulfilled, and if they fall to decay, reestablished. But, although nature had to surrender the task of providing for man, which in her vegetable productions she takes upon herself alone, yet the satisfaction of a so urgent need, where his and his entire species' existence is at stake, could not be entrusted to his uncertain insight. She therefore drew this matter, which in respect of *content* belongs in her domain, also in respect of *form* into the same, in that she laid necessity into the direction of willfulness. This was the genesis of instinct, which is nothing else, than a natural necessity through the medium of sentiment.

Instinct assails the sentient faculty through the double power of pain and pleasure: through pain, where it demands satisfaction, through pleasure where it finds it.

Since the necessity of nature brooks no concessions, man too, regardless of his freedom, must feel what nature wants him to feel, and accordingly, whether the feeling is of pain or of pleasure, there must unalterably ensue in him either abhorrence or desire. In this he is equivalent to an animal, and the most stubborn stoic will feel hunger and abhor it as fervently as the worm at his feet.

But, now the great difference begins. From desire and abhorrence among animals, action follows just as necessarily as desire ensued upon sensation, and sensation upon the outside impression. Here there is a chain, running ever onward, where every ring necessarily links into the other. Among mankind there is yet one more court, the will, which, as a supra-sensuous faculty, is subjugated neither to the law of nature, nor to that of reason, so that a totally free will remains, to direct itself according to the one or the other. The animal *must* strive to be rid of pain, a *person* can decide to keep it.

The will of man is a noble concept, also, when one pays no attention to its moral use. *Mere* will elevates man above beastliness; *moral* will elevates him to divinity. But, he must have left beastliness behind him, before he can approach divinity; hence, it is no small step toward the moral freedom of will, to break the necessity of nature in himself even in matters of no account, to exercise *mere* will.

The legislation of nature binds until it meets with the will, where it ceases and reason begins. Will here stands between both courts of law, and it alone decides from which it wants to receive the law; but will does not stand in the same relationship to both. As natural force, it is as free in respect of the one as the other; that means, it *need* not side with the one, nor with the other. But, it is not free as a moral force, which means, it *should* side with reason. It is not *bound* to either, but to the law of reason it is obliged. In fact, it therefore needs its freedom, even if it acts in contradiction to reason, but then it uses freedom basely, because, irrespective of its freedom, it still remains bound *within nature*, and makes no addition of reality to the opera-

tion of mere instinct; for, to *will* out of appetite, means only to desire with more effort.<sup>8</sup>

The legislation of nature through instinct can come into principled conflict with the legislation of reason, if instinct requires for its satisfaction an act which contradicts the moral principle. In this case, it is the immutable duty of the will, to pursue the demand of nature with the verdict of reason, since laws of nature oblige only conditionally, the laws of reason, however, absolutely and unconditionally.

But, nature vigorously claims her rights, and since she never makes demands fortuitously, she thus, unsatisfied, neither withdraws a demand. Since from the first cause, by means of which she is set in motion, until she meets with the will, where her legislation ceases, everything in her is strict necessity, she can therefore not *retreat* in surrender, but must always press *forward* against the will, which stands in the way of the fulfillment of her demand. It, in fact, sometimes seems as if she had shortened her course, and, without bringing her request before the will, it seems as if there were a direct causality for her action, through which she is redressed of her demands. In such a case, where the person not only let instinct take a free rein, rather, where instinct *seizes* the reins, the person were *only* animal; but it is very doubtful, whether this can ever be the case, and were he ever actually so, it is a question whether this blind power of his instinct is not, in fact, a crime of his will.

The faculty of desire insists on satisfaction, and the will is called upon to provide it. But, the will should receive its directing principle from reason, and only make a decision according to what reason allows or prescribes. If, now, the will, in fact, turns to reason before it approves the demands of instinct, then it acts morally; but if it decides directly, then it acts sensuously.<sup>9</sup>

Hence, as long as nature makes her demands, and wants to take the will by surprise by the blind force of emotion, it behooves the will to command nature to hold still until reason has spoken. Whether reason's verdict will turn out *for* or *against* the interests of sensuousness, that is just what

the will cannot yet know; but just for that reason, the will must follow this procedure in every emotion without exception, and deny to nature, in every case where she is the instigating element, direct causality. Only by breaking the force of desire, which with overhaste rushes toward its satisfaction, and would most like to scurry past the court of the will entirely, does man demonstrate his autonomy (independence), and prove himself a moral creature, which never merely desires nor merely abhors, but *must always want* his abhorrence and desire.

But, the mere inquiry of reason is already an encroachment on nature, who is a competent judge in her own affairs and will not see her verdicts subordinated to a new and alien jurisdiction. Each act of the will, which brings the affairs of the faculty of desire before the court of morality, is therefore, in reality, *contrary to nature*, because it makes something fortuitous out of what is necessary, and submits the decision to laws of reason in a matter where only laws of nature may speak, and have also actually spoken. For, as little as *pure reason* in its moral legislation considers how sense would like to receive its decisions, just as little does nature in her legislation take account of how she might justify herself to *pure reason*. In each of the two a different necessity holds sway, which, however, would be none at all, were one of them permitted to make fortuitous changes in the other.

For that reason, even the most courageous spirit, for all the resistance which he exercises against sensuousness, cannot repress emotion itself, desire itself, rather he can *merely* deny them influence upon the direction of his will; he can *disarm* instinct by moral means, but only *soothe* it by natural means. He can, by means of his independent power, prevent natural laws from becoming a compulsion for his will, but of these laws he himself can change absolutely nothing.

In emotions, therefore, where *first of all* nature (instinct) acts, and seeks either to *circumvent* the will entirely or to draw it violently to her side, morality of character

cannot express itself otherwise than through *resistance*, and, so that instinct not restrict freedom of will, only prevent it by restricting instinct. Accord with the laws of reason in emotions, therefore, is not otherwise possible than by contradiction of the demands of nature. And since nature never withdraws her demands for reasons of morality, everything consequently remains the same on her side, however the will, in view of that, may comport itself; there is, therefore, no congruity possible between inclination and duty, between reason and sensuousness, so that man here cannot act with the totality of his harmonizing nature, rather, exclusively and solely with his reasonable nature. In such cases, therefore, he also does not act *morally beautiful*, because inclination, too, must take part in the beauty of a deed, whereas here inclination is in conflict. But, he acts *morally great*, because all that, and only that is great, which testifies to the superiority of the higher faculty over the sensuous faculty.

The *beautiful* soul must, therefore, transform itself in emotion into a *noble* soul, and that is the unerring hallmark, whereby one can distinguish it from the *good heart* or *virtue of temperament*. If inclination in a person is only, therefore, on the side of justice, because justice fortunately finds itself on the side of inclination, then will the natural impulse in emotion exert a totally dominating force of compulsion over the will, and, where a sacrifice is necessary, morality and not sensuousness will bring it. If, on the other hand, it were reason itself which, as is the case in a beautiful character, binds inclination to the directions of *duty*, and *only entrusts* the rudder to sensuousness, then reason will take it back in the very moment when instinct wants to misuse its power. Virtue of temperament in emotion is, therefore, reduced to a mere product of nature; the beautiful soul passes over into the heroic, and elevates itself to pure intelligence.

Mastery of instinct by moral force is *freedom of mind*, and *dignity* is the name of its epiphany.

Strictly speaking, the moral force in man is capable of no representation, since that which is supra-sensuous can-